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ThITELLECTUALPROPERTY 
BLOCKBUSTER VIDEOS, INC. v. CITY OF TEMPE 
141 F. 3d 1295 (9th Cir. 1998) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a matter of first impression, the United Sates Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. 
City of Tempe, l considered whether section 1121(b) of the Lan-
ham Act preempts a municipality's authority to require the 
alteration of a federally registered trademark. 2 Based on the 
plain language of the statute, the court held that a local entity 
may not require the alteration of a trademark to enforce a 
zoning ordinance, though it may prohibit the display of the 
trademark.3 
1. 141 F. 3d 1295 (9th Gir. 1998). The appeal from the United StateB DiBtrict Court 
for the DiBtrict of Arizona was argued and BUbmitted on September 16, 1997 before 
Circuit JudgeB David R. Thompson, Herbert Y.C. Choy, and JameB R. Browning. Cir-
cuit Judge Thompson authored the opinion with Judge Browning concurring in part 
and diBsenting in part. 
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1996). Section U21(b) stateB: 
No Btate or other jurisdiction of the United StateB or any political BUbdivision 
or any agency thereof may require alteration of a regiBtered mark, or require 
that additional trademarkB, service markB, trade nameB, or corporate nameB 
that may be aBsociated with or incorporated into the registered mark be 
displayed in the mark in a manner differing from the display of such 
additional trademarkB, service markB, trade nameB, or corporate nameB 
contemplated by the regiBtered mark aB exhibited in the certificate of 
regiBtration iBBUed by the United StateB Patent and Trademark Office. 
15 U.S.C. § 1121(b). 
3. Blockbuster VideoB, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 141 F. 3d 1295, 1301 (9th Cir. 1998). 
106 
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Blockbuster Videos, Inc. and Video Update, Inc., national 
retail chains that rent and sell videos, leased space in Tempe, 
Arizona shopping centers. 4 According to local ordinances, 
Tempe shopping centers may specifY uniform guidelines for 
exterior signs in a sign package.1I A sign package is subject to 
approval by the Tempe Design Review Board. 6 Individual ten-
ants may apply for variances. 7 
Blockbuster leased space in a shopping center that required 
all signs to be in blue, red, or yellow letters. 8 Blockbuster ap-
plied to the Board for permission to display its registered serv-
ice marks. 9 The Board approved Blockbuster's use of its tom 
ticket sign, but prohibited the installation of its awning. 10 
Video Update leased space in a shopping center that re-
quired all signs to consist of white letters on a turquoise back-
ground. ll Video Update applied to the Board for permission to 
display its red lettered service mark. 12 The Board approved 
Video Update's use of red letters on its sign facing the street 
but required white letters for the sign inside the shopping cen-
ter.t3 
After unsuccessful appeals to the Board, both companies 
sued the City of Tempe under section 1121(b) of the Lanham 
Act. 14 The District Court for the District of Arizona consoli-
dated ·the two cases and granted each plaintiff a preliminary 
4. See Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 141 F. 3d 1295, 1296 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
5. See id. at 1297. Guidelines in a sign package typically address such characteris-
tics as color, size, and location. See id. 
6. See id. 
7. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1297. 
8. See id. 
9. See id. On~ of Blockbuster's registered marks was comprised of a tom ticket in 
blue and yellow; another was comprised of a blue awning. See id. 
10. See id. 
11. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1297. 
12. See id. 
13. See id. 
14. See id. 
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injunction allowing use of its registered service marks. 15 In the 
subsequent appeal, Blockbuster and Video Update requested 
both preliminary and permanent relief. 16 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A THE MAJORITY OPINION 
Following general rules of statutory interpretation, the 
Ninth Circuit first looked to the language of the federal stat-
ute.1? In considering whether the plain meaning of the words 
accurately reflected the legislative purpose of the statute, the 
court focused on the first clause of section 1121(b) which pro-
vides that no state or political subdivision or agency may re-
quire alteration of a registered mark. 18 The majority held that 
requiring a retailer to alter the color of its letters violated the 
statute since a color is a distinctive characteristic of a regis-
tered service mark. 19 Stating that consumer protection is a 
purpose of the Lanham Act, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a 
trademark must be a symbol that consumers will recognize. 20 
The court reasoned that if zoning regulations could require al-
terations to marks, such as changes to color schemes, compa-
nies would lose the consumer recognition established by uni-
form use of their trademarks. 21 Thus, in the case of Video Up-
date, the statute prevented local authorities from ordering a 
change from red letters to white letters. 22 
15. See w. 
16. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1297. 
17. See Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 141 F. 3d 1295, 1297 (9th Cir. 
1998); see also, supra note 2. 
18. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1297 (citing Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and 
Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985»; see supra note 2. The court defined an alteration as 
a change or modification of some particular characteristic that does not change the 
original into something else. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1297·1298 (citing Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 63 (1986». 
19. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1298. Following Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. 
Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995), the Ninth Circuit specifically noted that consumer recognition 
of a brand is often based on color. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1300. 
20. See Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1299 (citing Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198). 
21. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1300. 
22. See id. 
3
Shapiro: Intellectual Property Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
1999] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 109 
The Ninth Circuit next addressed the issue of whether the 
statute prevents a local government from prohibiting the dis.; 
play of a mark entirely. The court concluded that nothing in 
section 1121(b) requires that municipalities allow businesses to 
display their registered marks.23 Thus, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's ruling that a local government can 
prohibit display of a mark in its entirety. Therefore, Tempe 
could stop Blockbuster from displaying its blue awning mark. 24 
With an underlying understanding that Congress intended 
to protect registered marks from interference by local authori-
ties, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the relevant judicial decisions 
that preceded the amendment to the Lanham Act that created 
section 1121(b).2Ii The court stated that the second clause in 
section 1121(b) was Congress' direct response to Century 21 
Real Estate Corp. v. Nevada Real Estate Commission,26 whereas 
the first clause, prohibiting the alteration of a mark, was not 
necessary to the facts presented in Century 21.?:1 The Ninth 
Circuit then reasoned that Congress included the first clause of 
23. See id. at 1298. 
24. See id. at 1300. 
25. See id. at 1298. The Ninth Circuit pointed out that Congress enacted section 
1121(b) in reaction to a district court's holding in Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Ne-
vada Real Estate Comm'n, 448 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Nev. 1978), affd, 440 U.S. 941 (1979). 
See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1298-1299. In Century 21, a district court permitted the 
Nevada Real E.state Advisory Commission to require that a local franchisee's name be 
as large as the franchisor's name. See Century 21,448 F. Supp. at 1239. Century 21's 
registered service mark specified that the local franchisor's mark comprise only 20% of 
the mark. See id. After the Century 21 decision, other states adopted similar ordi-
nances requiring something other than the registered mark in terms of the proportion 
between the franchisor and franchisee names. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1298. 
Subsequently, in Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Town of Penfield, 934 F. Supp. 540 
(W.D.N.Y. 1996), a New York district court upheld an aesthetic zoning ordinance. See 
Payles8, 934 F. Supp. at 546. In Payless, local zoning regulations specified that signs 
be of one designated color, whereas the plaintiff, a shoe retailer, had a registered 
trademark with two colors. See id. at 541. In order to stop states from interfering with 
registered marks, Congress enacted section 1121. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1298 
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 97-778, at 1 (1982». See 8upra note 2. 
26. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1299; see supra notes 2 and 25. The second 
clause provides that additional marks may not be displayed in a registered mark "in a 
manner differing from the display of such additional trademarks ... contemplated by 
the registered mark." See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1299 (citing 15 U.S.C. 1121(b». 
27. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1299 (citing 15 U.S.C. 1121(b». 
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section 1121(b) to address the kinds of alteration presented by 
the facts in Video Update. 28 
The Ninth Circuit then referred to the legislative history, 
specifJ.Cally Congressman Barney Frank's concern that the pro-
posed statute would override uniform aesthetic or historic 
zoning lawS.29 Citing Frank's concern that entities such as Co-
lonial Williamsburg, Virginia must be allowed to regulate the 
appearance of their signs, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
these remarks acknowledged that Congress understood that 
zoning regulations could prohibit the display of trademarks on 
store signs.so However, the court reasoned that Congress could 
not have intended such a broad zoning exception that would 
permit local entities to require the alteration of a registered 
mark.a1 
B. THE DISSENTING OPINION 
Judge Browning, in his dissenting opinion, first concurred 
with the majority opinion regarding Tempe's right to prohibit 
Blockbuster's awning mark.82 He rejected, however, the ma-
jority's ruling that Tempe could not require Video Update to 
change its red lettering to white lettering.as Browning repudi-
ated the majority's reading of section 1121(b) as an "extreme 
interpretation ... that will give trademark holders the absolute 
28. See Blockbuster, 141 F. Sd at 1299. 
29. See id. (citing H.R. Rep, No. 97-778, at 10-11). 
SO. See Blockbuster, 141 F. Sd at 1299. 
S1. See id. at 1299. The Ninth Circuit also addreBBed and rejected Tempe's argu-
ment that the alteration of a registered mark faUs within the municipality's police 
power to ensure compliance with aesthetic zoning. See id. at 1298. Aesthetic regula-
tions, such as those pertaining to exterior signage, are recognized 88 a valid exercise of 
police power in regulating Fblic health, safety, and morals. See id. The court resolved 
this issue by concluding tliat the plain words of the federal statute clearly prohibit a 
municipality from requiring the alteration of a registered mark. See Uf. at 1298. The 
court also noted that in the Lanham Act, Congress did not exempt state zoning powers, 
whereas, CongreBB specifically exempted state zoning powers in the Copyright Act. See 
Blockbuster, 141 F. Sd at 1299 (citing 17 U.S.C. 0 SOl(bX4». Section SOl(bX4) states: 
"Nothing in this title annuls or limit8 any rights or remedies under the common law or 
statutes of any state with re8pect to ... (4) State and local landmarks, historic preser-
vation, zoning ...... 17 U.S.C. OSOl(bX4). 
S2. See Blockbuster, 141 F.Sd at lS01 (Browning, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part). 
88. Seeid. 
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right to display their marks .... "34 On his own examination of 
the legislative history, Judge Browning found a lack of support 
for the majority opinion in the testimony presented at congres-
sional hearings.35 
The dissenting opinion argued that the majority's interpre-
tation of section 1121(b) transformed a narrow clarification of 
the preemptive effect of the Lanham Act into a broad-ranging 
prohibition of aesthetic zoning.36 Browning distinguished an 
ordinance that would require a business to change its mark in 
"every subsequent use" from an ordinance that would affect the 
display of a mark in a specific location. 37 Judge Browning 
34. See itt. at 1306. 
35. See itt. at 1303-1305j see infra note 41. Judge Browning also asserted that the 
mejority incorrectly inferred that the absence of an explicit exemption for zoning in the 
Lanham Act, such as is found in the Copyright Act, clearly established that there was 
no such exemption. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1305j see supra note 31. Browning 
argued that the absence of explicit language providing for federal preemption under 
the Lanham Act is not analogous to the presence of an exemption for state regulation of 
zoning under the Copyright Act. See id. The dissenting opinion noted Congress en-
acted the Copyright Act to establish a uniform federal system of law controlling copy-
rights by preempting common law and state regulation. See id. Browning asserted 
that section 301(b) was carved out as an exception to allow additional protection for 
copyrights through zoning. See itt. at 1305. Based on its analysis, the dissent argued 
that the comparable exception to section 1121(b) would not allow for additional protec-
tion of trademarks, but would instead allow states to limit trademark rights through 
zoning. See itt. 
36. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1305-1306 (Browning, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part). 
37. See itt. at 1301-1302. The dissenting opinion reviewed the facts presented in 
Century 21, where the Nevada Real Estate Advisory Commission required changes to 
the mark in every format it was presented, such as -signs, letterheads, business cards, 
brochures, uniforms, name tags, folders, checks, forms, memo pads, desk plates, dis-
play materials, marketing materials, advertisements, etc." See itt. (citing Payless, 934 
F. Supp. at 543). Judge Browning reasoned that Congress intended to address local 
regulations that would affect every subsequent use of the mark and that Congress did 
not direct section 1121(b) at the regulation of aesthetic characteristics in particular 
shopping centers. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1302. Thus, Browning would allow 
regulation of color, size, and architectural features of an exterior sign in a particular 
shopping center even where that regulation would effectively prohibit display of a 
registered mark. See id. The dissenting opinion also argued that the mejority's ruling 
prohibiting Blockbuster's awning was inconsistent with its ruling allowing Video Up-
date's red lettered sign. See id. at 1303. The dissent contends that the court had no 
basis for interpreting section 1121(b) as controlling the regulation of color but not as 
controlling the regulation of architectural features. See id. According to the dissenting 
opinion, Congress intended to permit local regulation of architectural features and 
color as well as other components of aesthetic zoning. See itt. 
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pointed out that the majority failed to note this distinction and 
thereby greatly expanded the reach of the prohibition.38 
Judge Browning also argued that the legislative history 
provides unmistakable evidence of Congress' intent that local 
authorities retain the right to regulate signage through aes-
thetic zoning. 39 Considering Congressman's Frank's testimony 
before Congress, he found that Frank explicitly raised the issue 
of retaining such authority for local regulation of exterior sign-
age.40 Browning and concluded that the totality of the testi-
mony proved that Congress did not intend to eliminate the 
states' authority to engage in aesthetic zoning. 41 
The dissenting opinion favored interpreting section 1121(b) 
to allow local entities to promote scenic beauty and historical 
preservation,,2 Further, Judge Browning would permit local 
regulations that either prohibit the use of a registered trade-
mark or require alterations to a trademark, provided the ordi-
nance is truly local in nature and does not require the altera-
tion of a mark in every subsequent use. 43 
38. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1302-1303 (Browning, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part). 
39. See id. at 1303-1305. 
40. See id. at 1303-1304. 
41. See id. at 1303-1305. Jerry M. Patterson, author of the bill, testified that the 
legislation was not intended to limit the right of states to regulate signs pertaining to 
registered trademarks, but it was intended to prohibit regulations that would require 
alterations to a mark. See id. at 1303 (citing Lanham Act Trademark Act Amendment, 
Hearing on H.R. 5154 before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admini-
stration of Justice, 97th Congo at 13 (1982)). Gerald J. Mossinghoff, then Com mis-
s.ioner of Patents and Trademarks, commented that the proposed statute was not in-
tended to interfere with local aesthetic or historic-type zoning that specified a uniform 
sign requirement in a particular locality. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1303 (citing 
H.R. Rep. No. 97-778, at 10-11). Senator Orrin Hatch noted that the bill would not 
prevent states from creating regulations that would promote scenic beauty, historical 
preservation, or environmental protection. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1305 (citing 
Congo Rec. S-12636 (1982)). 
42. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1302 (Browning, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part). 
43. See id. at 1301. 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit's decision creates a potential split in the 
circuits regarding interpretation of section 1121(b) as to 
whether a local entity may require a business to alter its mark 
under any circumstances. While no other court of appeals has 
yet interpreted the statute, a New York District Court has 
taken the opposite position to that of the Ninth Circuit. 44 At 
the same time, a district court in Connecticut ruled in accor-
dance with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Blockbuster. 46 
More important, the Ninth Circuit and the district courts 
are thus far in agreement that a local entity may prohibit dis-
play of a registered mark in its entirety.46 Since a retail store 
cannot reasonably operate without exterior signage, this hold-
ing, in effect, means that a retailer is either required to alter 
its registered mark in order to display an exterior sign that 
conforms to a local sign package or faces the prospect of the 
economic harm that would necessarily result from having no 
44. See Lisa's Party City v. Town of Henrietta, 2 F. Supp. 2d 378 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 
In Lisa's Party City, a retailer sought to install an exterior sign comprised of multi-
color letters in a shopping center that required that all signs be red. See id. at 380. 
Following Payless, the district court concluded that Henrietta's zoning ordinance did 
not violate section 1121(b). See id. at 381; see supra note 25. The district court consid-
ered Blockbuster, but indicated that Lisa's Party City presented different facts. See id., 
at 381 n. 1. However, the court's comparison of facts is rather conclusory. In Lisa's 
Party City, the retailer wanted to install a multi-color sign in a shopping area desig-
nated for red-lettered signs. See id. at 380. In Blockbuster, Video Update wanted to 
install a red-lettered sign in a shopping center which had selected white lettering for 
its exterior signage. See Blockbuster, 141 F. 3d at 1297. Moreimportantly, the New 
York court found the Blockbuster dissent more persuasive than the majority opinion. 
See Lisa's Party City, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 381, n.1. In Lisa's Party City, the court ulti-
mately held that the enactment of section 1121(b) was not intended to frustrate local 
zoning control. See id. 
45. Gateway 2000 Country Stores, Inc. v. Norwalk Zoning Board of Appeals, 13 F. 
Supp. 2d 247 (D. Conn. 1998). In Gateway 2000, a Connecticut district court denied a 
motion for a preliminary injunction that would have restrained the city from enforcing 
certain zoning regulations. See id. at 248. Gateway 2000, a computer retailer, had a 
registered trademark comprised of a stylized golden 'G' symbol and its name, each in a 
designated proportion. See id. at 248. In order to maintain these proportions, Gateway 
2000 requested a variance allowing larger signs. See id. at 249. Relying upon Block-
buster, the court concluded that a zoning ordinance may preclude the display of a regis-
tered mark though it may not require alteration ofthe mark. See id. at 251-252. 
46. See supra notes 23 and 44. 
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exterior sign. 47 Thus, in the context of signage for a retail 
store, an interpretation of section 1121(b), such as the Ninth 
Circuit's in Blockbuster, which allows a municipality to prohibit 
display of a trademark, may have the unanticipated outcome of 
effectively reducing the Lanham Act's protection of trade-
marks. 
Mary L. Shapiro * 
47. In Blockbuster, the Ninth Circuit was not presented with such facts since 
Blockbuster had more than one registered mark and thus was permitted to display a 
registered mark, though not permitted to display both of its marks. See Blockbuster, 
141 F. 3d at 1297,1301. 
* QQlden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1998. 
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